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The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: 
Is the Jury Still Out?
Brian H. Bornstein, Department of Psychology, 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
Despite the need to assess the ecological validity of jury simulation research 
before generalizing from simulations to the behavior of real jurors, surprisingly 
little jury research has directly addressed issues of validity. The present paper 
reviews the extant research on two aspects of the validity question—specifi cally, 
research that has compared different samples of mock jurors, and research that 
has manipulated the medium of trial presentation. In addition, jury simulation 
research published in the fi rst 20 years of Law and Human Behavior is analyzed 
with respect to these variables. The majority of simulations used student-
jurors and presented the trial in written form. Additionally, the methodology 
of simulation research has actually become less realistic over time. However, 
this trend is not necessarily cause for concern, as a review of the literature 
reveals little research that has obtained differences between different mock juror 
samples or different trial media. 
Systematic research on jury decision making can be said to have two birthdates: The Chicago 
Jury Project (e.g., Broeder, 1959; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966) and the inaugural issue in 1977 
of Law and Human Behavior, the fi rst journal devoted solely to interdisciplinary research 
in psychology and law. Because of the myriad legal and logistical problems attendant to 
conducting research on the decision-making processes of jurors as they serve in actual 
cases, the vast majority of jury research has employed simulations. Both commentators on 
and performers of jury research have, from the very beginning, voiced concerns about the 
ecological validity of jury simulations (e.g., Bray & Kerr, 1982; Davis, Bray, & Holt, 1977; 
Diamond, 1979; Gerbasi, Zuckerman, & Reis, 1977). 
The question of validity raises a number of issues (Bray & Kerr, 1979; Diamond, 
1997; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). Major validity concerns include the mock juror sample 
(i.e., undergraduates vs. community-dwelling adults), the research setting (i.e., laboratory 
vs. courtroom), the trial medium (i.e., written summaries vs. more realistic simulations), 
the trial elements included (e.g., the presence or absence of deliberation), the dependent 
variables used (e.g., dichotomous verdicts vs. probability-of-guilt judgments), and the 
consequentiality of the task (i.e., making a hypothetical vs. a real decision). 
These concerns are justifi ed not only by fundamental principles governing the sound 
conduct of scientifi c research, but also by the desire to apply fi ndings from simulation 
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studies to understanding, and ultimately improving, the legal system. The courts have 
considered psychological research in issuing rulings on a number of topics, such as capital 
punishment (Ellsworth, 1988), the effects of pretrial publicity (Carroll et al., 1986), and 
jury decision rules (Nemeth, 1977), to mention but a few. In considering what use to 
make of psychological research on the jury system, the extent to which empirical fi ndings 
generalize to actual settings is crucial (Carroll et al., 1986; Diamond, 1997). For example, 
the perceived lack of external validity has been used by the Supreme Court in choosing to 
discount research on the death-qualifi cation process (Ellsworth, 1988; Thompson, 1989). 
However, despite these important questions, and in spite of Bray and Kerr’s (1979, p. 
109) call 20 years ago “to conduct a series of careful studies that systematically explore the 
range of actors, behaviors, and contexts over which results of simulation studies will hold,” 
surprisingly little research has directly addressed issues of validity. The present paper has 
three components: First, I review the research that has compared different samples of mock 
jurors. Second, I review research that has manipulated the manner of trial presentation. 
Although these topics have been covered recently in a general review by Diamond (1997), 
an extensive survey of these particular issues has not been conducted. These particular 
questions are chosen not because they are any more important than other validity concerns, 
but for three reasons: First, the mock juror sample and trial medium are methodological 
dimensions on which current jury simulation research displays considerable diversity, 
as the review makes clear. Second, they are variables that are relatively amenable to 
modifi cation, should important differences be found-unlike some of the other issues, 
such as the consequentiality of the task (Kerr, Nerenz, & Herrick, 1979). Third, they are 
among the most frequently raised issues in the constellation of factors that comprise the 
“validity question” (e.g., Bray & Kerr, 1982; Davis et al., 1977; Diamond, 1997; Konecni 
& Ebbesen, 1979). 
The third, and fi nal, component of the paper is an analysis of jury simulation research 
published in the fi rst 20 years of Law and Human Behavior. The purpose of this part of the 
paper is twofold: First, to determine the relative frequency with which various research 
methodologies are being used; and second, to uncover any trends that might be occurring 
with respect to experimental verisimilitude. 
WHO ARE THE JURORS? 
Although college undergraduates are the participants of choice in most human 
psychological research, empirical fi ndings with undergraduate participants do not always 
generalize to the population as a whole (Sears, 1986). The issue of the research sample 
is particularly important in studying jury behavior because of the relative infrequency 
with which college students serve on actual juries (Bray & Kerr, 1982) and because of 
the uses to which some of the fi ndings may ultimately be put (i.e., modifying the court 
system). There are three approaches to examining the effect of jurors’ characteristics on 
their judgments: correlational studies, done usually within the context of scientifi c jury 
selection, that have investigated relationships between various attitudinal and demographic 
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variables and jurors’ verdicts; experimental studies that have directly compared different 
samples of mock jurors; and multiexperiment studies that have replicated an empirical 
result with a sample of a different type from that used to demonstrate the result initially. 
The fi ndings of each of these approaches are treated in turn. 
Scientifi c Jury Selection 
Hepburn (1980) found that nine demographic variables accounted for only 8% of 
the variance in mock jurors’ verdicts for a hypothetical murder trial; only two of the 
variables-age and prior military service-were signifi cantly correlated with participants’ 
verdicts. This relatively weak relationship between demographic factors and mock jurors’ 
judgments refl ects the mediating effect of the type of case (Horowitz, 1980). For example, 
in a rape case, female mock jurors are often more likely than male mock jurors to fi nd a 
rape defendant guilty (e.g., Ugwuegbu, 1979); when the crime is murder, however, there is 
no sex difference (Bray & Noble, 1978). 
Studies of actual jurors in trials for a variety of felonies have shown that jurors’ sex 
also interacts with a number of personality measures (Mills & Bohannon, 1980; Moran & 
Comfort, 1982). For example, Mills & Bohannon (1980) found that socialization scores 
were positively correlated with guilty verdicts for male jurors, but negatively for female 
jurors; empathetic male jurors were more likely to acquit, but not empathetic female jurors; 
and autonomous jurors were more likely to acquit, regardless of sex. With regard to race, 
two studies of actual criminal trials found a main effect of race, such that Whites were more 
likely to convict than Blacks (Broeder, 1959; Simon, 1967). Using a simulated rape case, 
Ugwuegbu (1979) found a more subtle effect of race: White participants judged a Black 
defendant more culpable than a White defendant, but Black participants displayed the 
opposite pattern. Similar studies, however, have found an effect of neither sex (Bridgeman 
& Marlowe, 1979; Hepburn, 1980) nor race (Hepburn, 1980). Such inconsistent fi ndings led 
Fulero and Penrod (1990), in a review of the effi cacy of scientifi c jury selection, to conclude 
that demographic variables were at best only modest predictors of juror verdicts. 
Direct Experimental Comparisons 
The research on scientifi c jury selection has tended not to address the infl uence of 
whether jurors are students. As much simulation research employs student mock jurors, this 
variable is of particular importance to the present discussion of ecological validity (Sears, 
1986). A number of experimental studies have compared the verdicts of undergraduate 
mock jurors to those of a more diverse sample.1 The nonstudent samples in these studies 
1 Although the focus of the present article is on the student versus nonstudent comparison, it 
is worth noting that a few experiments have compared other categories of mock jurors, such as 
judges and attorneys (e.g., Foley, Adams, & Goodson, 1996; Simon & Mahan, 1971). For example, 
Landsman and Rakos (1994) presented 88 judges and 104 jury pool volunteers the same written 
summary of a product liability case. The verdicts of the two groups did not differ, and they were 
affected similarly by exposure to a judicial decision concerning potentially biasing material.
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have been obtained in a variety of ways: from voter registration lists, potential jurors 
awaiting or having completed jury duty, or a variety of community locales. In all cases, the 
nonstudent sample is older and more heterogeneous demographically.
Finkel and colleagues have devised an elegant yet simple method for comparing the 
judgments of students and nonstudents. In several experiments (Finkel & Duff, 1991; Finkel 
& Handel, 1989; Finkel, Hughes, Smith, & Hurabiell, 1994; Finkel, Hurabiell, & Hughes, 
1993a, b; Finkel, Meister, & Lightfoot, 1991; Fulero & Finkel, 1991), student participants were 
asked to recruit nonstudent participants over the age of 21 years. Both groups of participants 
completed booklets that described hypothetical trials and asked them to make judgments 
as though they were real jurors. For example, Finkel & Handel (1989) compared a sample 
of undergraduate students (M age = 20 years, range = 18-36) to a nonstudent, adult sample 
(M age = 45 years, range = 22-84) on their decisions about a number of cases involving the 
insanity defense. There were no differences in the verdicts reached by the two samples. 
This fi nding is typical of studies that have compared student and nonstudent mock 
jurors. Table 1 summarizes the results of 26 studies that have addressed the effect of 
student status on mock jurors’ judgments. These studies have presented mock jurors with a 
range of trial types, including murder—both with (e.g., Fulero & Finkel, 1991) and without 
(Elliott & Robinson, 1991) an insanity defense—armed robbery (e.g., Kramer, Kerr, & 
Carroll, 1990), assault (Greene, Wilson, & Loftus, 1989), and civil cases (e.g., Bornstein 
& Rajki, 1994; Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989). They have also included a variety of 
treatment variables, such as the presence of expert (Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989) or 
hypnotically refreshed testimony (Greene et al., 1989), the defi nition of insanity (Roberts 
& Golding, 1991), the type of pretrial publicity (Kramer et al., 1990), and defendant status 
(Bray, Struckman-Johnson, Osborne, McFarlane, & Scott, 1978). 
In weighing the generalizability of fi ndings based on undergraduate samples, it is 
important to ascertain not only whether one group of participants tends to reach harsher 
or more lenient verdicts; it is also necessary to determine whether sample characteristics 
interact with other variables of interest (Bray & Kerr, 1982; Kramer & Kerr, 1989). For 
example, in a meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and mock jurors’ 
verdicts, Narby, Cutler, and Moran (1993) found that the mock juror sample moderated the 
relationship. Specifi cally, authoritarianism was a better predictor of conviction rates among 
nonstudents than among students (though it was a signifi cant predictor for both samples). 
Thus, the Results column of Table 1 includes two pieces of information: fi rst, whether there 
was a main effect of the sample (students vs, nonstudents) on participants’ verdicts; and 
second, whether the sample variable interacted with any treatment variables. 
In only 5 of the 26 studies was there a main effect of sample on participants’ verdicts.2 
Simon & Mahan (1971) found that student-jurors were more likely to fi nd a murder 
defendant not guilty than were adult prospective jurors; other researchers have found a 
similar tendency toward greater leniency among students judging both a murder trial that 
2 A fi fth study (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988, Experiment 1) found that although mock juries composed 
of undergraduates were just as likely to convict as juries composed of community residents—when a 
fi nal verdict was reached—they were signifi cantly less likely to hang. 
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involved the battered-woman defense (Schuller & Hastings, 1996) and a robbery trial 
(Berman & Cutler, 1996). In the other two studies where differences were found between 
students and nonstudents, the effect was more ambiguous: Finkel et al. (1991) found that 
student-jurors were less likely than community-jurors to reach a verdict of self-defense, 
but in only one of three cases; there was no difference between samples in the other two 
cases. Using simulated civil cases involving illegal searches, Casper et al. (1989) found 
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that student- jurors awarded more in compensation than adults who had been called for jury 
duty, but they did not award more in punitive damages. Thus, the overwhelming majority 
of studies that have directly compared different mock juror samples have failed to fi nd 
consistent differences. When differences have been found, they tend to refl ect that student-
jurors are a “softer touch,” in that they are more likely to fi nd for criminal defendants 
and award more to civil plaintiffs. This tendency might refl ect students’ relatively greater 
idealism, education, and political liberalism (Sears, 1986). In one case, however, student-
jurors were harsher, being less receptive to a defense of self-defense (Finkel et al., 1991). 
These studies have also tended to fi nd few interactions between the mock juror sample 
and other variables. In trials where key evidence is offered by an eyewitness, experienced 
jurors’ guilt judgments are infl uenced more than student-jurors’ judgments by whether or 
not the witness searched through mugshot books and whether or not a weapon was present 
(Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990); however, Cutler et al. also failed to fi nd signifi cant 
interactions between the participant sample and eight other factors relating to the eyewitness 
and identifi cation conditions, including the witness’s expressed confi dence. 
Similarly, Bornstein & Rajki (1994) found that although student-jurors’ judgments 
in a simulated product liability case did not differ from those of a nonstudent, community 
sample, the sample variable did interact with mock jurors’ race and characteristics of the 
plaintiff’s injury. For example, White and minority students’ judgments did not differ, but 
minority nonstudents were more likely to fi nd the defendant liable than White nonstudents. 
Participants’ judgments also varied as a function of certain demographic variables-such as 
race and socioeconomic status- that tend to be correlated with student versus nonstudent 
status. However, such interactions are the exception rather than the norm. The remaining 
24 studies reported no signifi cant interactions involving the mock juror sample, providing 
strong evidence that factors at trial affect students and nonstudents in the same way. 
Experimental Replications 
A number of studies allow for indirect comparison between students and nonstudents, 
by performing multiple experiments in which a particular fi nding is replicated with a different 
sample. These studies differ from the direct comparisons discussed above in that the mock 
juror sample is not included as a variable within a single experiment; consequently, there is 
typically no statistical comparison between samples, allowing only an indirect comparison. 
The fi ndings in this category of simulations are consistent with those described above; 
that is, there are few differences between student and nonstudent samples. For example, 
Fontaine & Kiger (1978, Experiment 1) showed student-jurors a videotape of a murder 
trial in which they varied the defendant’s manner of dress and whether he was supervised 
by an armed guard. Participants judged the defendant’s degree of guilt for a more severe 
charge (i.e., second-degree murder as opposed to manslaughter) as greater when he wore 
personal dress and was supervised by an armed guard, or wore institutional dress and was 
unsupervised, compared to the other conditions. In a second experiment, they obtained the 
same result with an older sample (M age = 45.2 years) drawn from voter registration lists. 
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Other cross-experimental comparisons have shown that student- and community-jurors 
also respond similarly to age variations in eyewitnesses (Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith, 
& Michelli, 1987) and variations in the seriousness of the criminal charge and the severity of 
the penalty associated with a guilty verdict (Freedman, Krismer, MacDonald, & Cunningham, 
1994). In addition, despite the many respects in which undergraduate students and a community-
drawn sample are likely to differ attitudinally and demographically, measures of individual 
differences in mock jurors’ pretrial bias (e.g., toward the prosecution or the defense) predict 
verdicts equally well in the two samples (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). 
One variable for which uniformity does not appear to be the case is different types 
of jury instructions. Elwork, Sales, & Alfi ni (1977) found that instructions revised to 
enhance jurors’ comprehension had similar effects on mock jurors drawn from both an 
undergraduate subject pool and the community. However, Halverson, Hallahan, Hart, 
& Rosenthal (1997) obtained results that are at odds with those of Elwork et al. In two 
experiments, Halverson et al. presented mock jurors with an audiotaped DWI trial. In both 
experiments, they manipulated the type of written jury instructions (standard or revised for 
better comprehension) and the judge’s belief in the defendant’s guilt (guilty or not guilty). 
The judges read the same instructions regardless of their belief, so that only their nonverbal 
behavior might vary. In Experiment 1, in which 95% of the mock jurors were students (M 
age = 19 years), neither variable exerted an effect on participants’ verdicts; nor was there 
a signifi cant interaction. In Experiment 2, which was virtually identical except for the 
inclusion of adult mock jurors drawn from the community (M age = 42 years), there was 
again no effect of either variable independently; however, there was a signifi cant interaction, 
such that the judge’s belief (communicated nonverbally) infl uenced participants’ verdicts 
when the standard instructions were used, but not the revised instructions. 
Thus, although the main effect of instructions was the same for both samples (as in 
Elwork et al., 1977), the instructions’ effect did vary across samples when combined with 
the variable of the judge’s belief. There are three reasons not to be overly concerned by this 
fi nding: First, the sample size in Halverson et al.’s (1997) second experiment (10–14 per 
cell) is much smaller than in their fi rst experiment (30 per cell), making the results of the 
second experiment potentially less stable. Second, nearly half (45%) of their student sample 
in Experiment 1 consisted of high school, not college students; thus, it does not clearly shed 
light on the question of how undergraduates—who are usually over 18 and therefore jury-
eligible—differ from a community sample. Third, and perhaps most important, it is one of the 
exceptions among the much larger number of studies which have failed to fi nd differences—
either main effects or interactions—between undergraduate and community samples. 
HOW IS THE TRIAL PRESENTED? 
Less research has addressed the variable of the trial medium than characteristics of the 
mock juror sample. Although a few studies have manipulated the trial medium directly, a 
greater number have done so indirectly, by replicating a particular fi nding obtained in one 
experiment using a different trial medium in a second experiment. 
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Direct Experimental Comparisons 
A summary of research that has compared different trial presentation media is 
displayed in Table 2. These studies have employed a variety of media, ranging from live 
trials (Hosch, Beck, & McIntyre, 1980; Miller, 1976; Williams et al., 1975)3 to brief written 
summaries (e.g., Bermant, McGuire, McKinley, & Salo, 1974; Juhnke, Vought, Pyszczynski, 
Dane, Losure, & Wrightsman, 1979). The majority manipulated the medium of the entire 
trial, in order to test whether trial information as a whole is more persuasive or emotionally 
arousing depending on the mode of presentation (e.g., Fishfader, Howells, Katz, & Teresi, 
1996). However, several experiments explored different media to assess the effect of specifi c 
procedural innovations, such as videotaped (vs. audiotaped or written) testimony (Borgida, 
1979) or confessions (Lassiter, Slaw, Briggs, & Scanlan, 1992). The use of live, as opposed 
to videotaped, testimony is an especially pertinent, yet controversial, procedural alternative 
in trials involving child witnesses (Swim, Borgida, & McCoy, 1993). 
As with the variable of participant sample, presentation medium does not have an 
effect in the majority of cases, exerting a main effect on mock jurors’ verdicts in only 3 of 
11 studies. Furthermore, the studies where a main effect was found offer confl icting results. 
Juhnke et al. (1979) found that increased verisimilitude (i.e., going from written summaries 
or transcripts to audiotape or videotape) produced more guilty verdicts in a simulated trial 
of a defendant charged with transporting a stolen vehicle across state lines. Bermant et 
al. (1974), on the other hand, obtained the opposite result; mock jurors exposed to an 
audiotaped murder trial were less likely to fi nd the defendant guilty than participants who 
read a less realistic summary or transcript of the trial. It is possible that this inconsistency 
is due to differences in the type of trial; however, Wilson (1996, Experiment 3) found 
that mock jurors were more likely to fi nd the defendant in a simulated murder trial guilty 
when the trial was presented on videotape than when they read a transcript of the trial. 
Thus, studies that have directly compared presentation media—for either a whole trial or a 
portion of testimony—fail to offer consistent fi ndings. 
These studies explored a number of treatment variables in addition to presentation 
medium, including the number of eyewitnesses and type of character testimony (Borgida, 
1979), the presence or absence of expert testimony (Hosch et al., 1980), and the manner in 
which evidence damaging to one party was raised (Williams, Bourgeois, & Croyle, 1993). 
However, there was only one instance in which the trial medium interacted with one of these 
other variables. Specifi cally, Borgida (1979) found that mock jurors in a civil negligence 
trial who viewed videotaped testimony rendered more pro-plaintiff verdicts when there was 
only one character witness than when there were relatively many (two or four); however, the 
3 The study by Hosch et al. (1980), which is also included in Table 1, confounded sample with 
trial medium. Community-jurors made judgments about a live trial, which was subsequently viewed 
on videotape by a group of student-jurors. Because no single experiment has manipulated sample and 
trial medium orthogonally, the Hosch et al. study is included in both this and the previous section 
despite this confound, with the caveat that the null effect found between the two groups could possibly 
be due to the two variables canceling each other out. 
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verdicts of mock jurors who viewed a videotape of someone reading a transcript of the same 
testimony aloud were unaffected by the number of witnesses. There is some evidence as well 
that mock jurors’ authoritarianism interacts with the trial medium, such that the relationship 
between authoritarianism and judgments of defendant culpability is stronger for live trials 
than for less realistic simulations (Narby et al., 1993). 
Experimental Replications
As in the case of the mock juror sample, the majority of indirect comparisons 
involving trial medium have successfully replicated their major fi ndings despite the 
change in medium. For example, Ross, Dunning, Toglia, & Ceci (1990) varied the key 
witness’s age in a 50-min videotaped reenactment of a drug possession trial. Although the 
witness’s age did not affect mock jurors’ verdicts, a young adult (21-year-old) witness was 
perceived as signifi cantly less credible than either an elderly (74-year-old) or a child (8-
year-old) witness. These fi ndings were replicated in a subsequent experiment in which the 
identical manipulation was employed, but the same trial was presented as a 15-page written 
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transcript. A post hoc comparison of the two experiments showed, furthermore, that trial 
medium did not affect mock jurors’ guilt judgments, nor did it interact with the age of the 
witness (Ross et al., 1989). 
Trial presentation medium has also been found not to alter the effect of a number of 
other variables. For example, the jury’s decision rule has the same effect on mock jurors’ 
verdicts whether the trial is presented in the form of a written summary or staged live 
(Nemeth, 1977), and whether or not multiple crimes are joined at trial results in the same 
pattern of verdicts when testimony is offered in either summary or transcript form (Greene 
& Loftus, 1985). Trial medium also fails to moderate the effect on mock jurors’ verdicts 
of their attitudes toward the death penalty (Elliott & Robinson, 1991) or the age of a key 
eyewitness (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Goodman et al., 1987). Thus, as with research on 
the juror sample, research on the trial medium tends not to fi nd many differences. 
METHODOLOGICAL VARIATIONS IN 20 YEARS OF JURY 
SIMULATIONS 
In their review of jury simulation research prior to 1979, Bray & Kerr (1979) found 
that the most common simulations were those employing student samples and written 
trial summaries. Given the potentially limited generalizability of such studies, are such 
“unrealistic” simulations still the norm? Diamond (1997) recently addressed this question, 
reaching the cautiously optimistic conclusion that current simulations are more realistic than 
their predecessors. Although Diamond raises and clarifi es a number of important issues in 
jury simulation research—especially with respect to its application to the courts—she does 
not provide a detailed chronological analysis to support this conclusion. Such an analysis 
is the purpose of the fi nal section of this paper. 
For two reasons, one might expect a trend toward greater verisimilitude over the 
years: First, because of the persistent concerns about generalizability enunciated above; and 
second, because technological advancements have increasingly made it easier to incorporate 
realistic stimuli, such as videotaped trial reenactments, into experimental simulations. In an 
effort to summarize developments in jury simulation research, the present study chronicles 
jury simulations published in the fi rst 20 years of Law and Human Behavior (LHB). 
Although publications in a single journal are obviously not exhaustive, LHB is nonetheless 
the premier American journal for research on psychology and law. A variety of applied 
journals (e.g., Applied Cognitive Psychology, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Applied, Journal of Applied Social Psychology), as well as other 
interdisciplinary journals (e.g., Behavioral Sciences and the Law; Law and Society Review; 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law) and law reviews, also publish occasional articles 
on jury behavior. Because LHB is the primary outlet for this kind of research and is the 
offi cial journal of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of the American 
Psychological Association), it was felt that its contents (especially over a 20-year period) 
would be suffi ciently representative of the fi eld. 
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To assess the validity of limiting the chronological analysis to publications in a single 
journal, I also tabulated all jury simulations published between 1992 and 1996 in the 
following journals: Behavioral Sciences and the Law (BSL), Journal of Applied Psychology 
(JAP), Journal of Applied Social Psychology (JASP), and Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology (JPSP). During this 5-year period, the number of simulation studies published 
in these journals was 10 in BSL (6.8% of all articles), 6 in JAP (1.4% of all articles), 22 
in JASP (3.8% of all articles), and 2 in JPSP (0.2% of all articles). In comparison, LHB 
published 44 simulation studies (21.2% of all articles), more than the other four journals 
combined. With the exception of the JAP articles, the majority of simulations published 
in each of these journals employed undergraduate jurors and written trial materials, which 
was true of LHB as well (see below). Thus, the research methodologies appear not to differ 
substantially across different publication outlets, making it reasonable to explore trends in 
LHB as representative of the fi eld as a whole. 
Method 
The fi rst 20 years of LHB were reviewed to identify all jury simulation studies. “Jury 
simulations” were defi ned as studies in which participants were asked, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to adopt the role of jurors (Weiten & Diamond, 1979); that is, they were presented 
with a trial and asked to make judgments, either individually or after deliberation, that real jurors 
might make, such as guilt, liability, sentencing, or damages. Thus, studies in which participants 
read or saw a trial and were asked to report attitudes or make attributions or credibility ratings, 
but did not in some fashion assess the litigants’ guilt, liability, or penalty, were excluded from 
analysis. Such exclusions were rare; the majority of simulations investigating witness credibility, 
for instance, also included a guilt measure (e.g., Ross et al., 1990). 
Each simulation was classifi ed in terms of the mock juror sample (undergraduates, 
community adults, or real jurors awaiting or having completed jury duty) and the medium 
in which the trial was presented (written summary, transcript, audiotape, videotape, or 
live). In the event that a study included more than one sample type or different media-
either within a single experiment or across experiments-it was counted as one-half for each 
category (no study included more than two sample populations or media).4 
Results 
Summary of the Data 
In the fi rst 20 years of LHB (1977–1996), there were 113 jury simulation studies.5 
Thirty-two of these studies (28.3%) were multiple-experiment papers. Jury simulations 
4 Eighteen studies permitted a comparison of different participant samples (14 within a single 
experiment and 4 across experiments), while 8 studies (4 within a single experiment, 4 across 
experiments) permitted a comparison of different media. All of these studies are summarized in the 
preceding sections and accompanying tables. 
5 A complete list of the simulations is available from the author. 
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comprised 19.4% of the total number of research articles during the period.6 The 
distribution of studies across these samples and media is shown in Table 3. As the table 
indicates, the majority of simulations are as unrealistic as they were when the fi eld was 
reviewed 20 years ago (Bray & Kerr, 1979; Davis et al., 1977). Nearly two-thirds of the 
studies (65%) had students play the role of jurors, and over half (55%) presented the trial 
in written form (summary or transcript). Only two studies had participants observe and 
make judgments about a case that involved live actors (Borgida, DeBono, & Buckman, 
1990; Hosch et al., 1980). 
Chronological Trends
Because there were very few simulations published in some years (no studies in 1982, 
and one each in 1977, 1981, 1986, and 1992), the 20 years were divided into ten 2-year 
intervals to provide greater stability for exploring trends. The bottom line in Fig. 1 shows 
the percentage of total articles that were jury simulations. This percentage ranges from a 
low of 2% in 1981-1982 to a high of 35.6% in 1989-1990. There has been a slight trend over 
time toward the inclusion of a greater proportion of articles on jury behavior, as indicated 
by the positive slope of the regression line that best fi ts these data points (slope = 1.86; R2 
= .31). Although the number of jury simulations published in a single journal is but one 
indication of the amount of research being conducted in the fi eld, it nonetheless suggests 
that jury simulation research is alive and well (Diamond, 1997; Thompson, 1993). 
6 Percentages were used as the dependent measure, rather than frequencies, because of the 
increase from four to six issues that took place in 1990 (Volume 14). To compute this percentage, 
it was necessary to determine (for the denominator) what constituted a “research article.” A fairly 
liberal defi nition was employed, such that the only items excluded from the count were editorials, 
bibliographic searches (a short-lived feature of the journal in 1983), self-standing appendices, book 
reviews, obituaries, and adversary forums. This classifi cation scheme is admittedly arbitrary, but it 
includes all articles reporting original, substantive research (theoretical or empirical) without being 
overly conservative. 
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Figure 1 also shows, as a function of time, the percentage of simulations that employed 
student-jurors and that presented videotape trials (there are no data points for 1981-1982 
because there was only one simulation in these two years combined). As indicated in the fi gure, 
videotape simulations are not becoming more common, despite the lowered cost and increased 
availability of video equipment compared to 20 years ago. In fact, a regression equation 
indicates that videotape trials are actually becoming somewhat less common over time (slope 
= – 1.5, R2 = .20). In addition, the percentage of simulations with students as mock jurors is 
clearly increasing. A regression line fi tting the data for the percentage of simulations using 
student jurors has a strongly positive slope of 4.9 (R2 = .63). Thus, jury simulations in Law and 
Human Behavior are, if anything, becoming less realistic over time. The “state of the science” 
may indeed be one of increasing sophistication in some respects (Diamond, 1997; Thompson, 
1993), but this sophistication has not been accompanied by increasing verisimilitude in terms of 
who the mock jurors are and how the simulated trial is presented to them. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the prevalence of simulations in studying jury behavior, some research has 
been conducted on real jurors as well. Broadly speaking, there have been two approaches 
to studying real jurors. In one approach, jurors are questioned about the trial in which they 
were involved after completing jury duty (e.g., Moran & Comfort, 1982; Reifman, Gusick, 
& Ellsworth, 1992; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995). Al-though this method has the drawback of 
potential memory bias in jurors’ retrospective reports, it tends to support the fi ndings of 
simulation studies. For example, Reifman et al. (1992) found that, as with mock jurors, real 
jurors’ comprehension of the instructions that they receive at trial is not very good. 
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The second approach, which is rarer, is to manipulate variables of interest within actual 
trials. Heuer & Penrod (1988, 1994a, b) are the leading practitioners of this method, having 
investigated the effects of procedural variations such as whether jurors in actual cases are 
allowed to take notes or ask questions during trial. Such efforts are to be commended and 
encouraged; however, because of the enormous logistical problems inherent in such research, 
simulation studies are likely to continue as the norm. Simulations are also popular because 
of the better opportunities they afford for preserving experimental control, testing specifi c 
psychological theories or procedural innovations that could not be practically implemented in a 
real courtroom, and so forth (Bray & Kerr, 1979; Diamond, 1997; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). 
The propriety of conducting simulation research in an attempt to generalize to the 
behavior of real jurors is a serious issue, and one that raises a number of important questions. 
As noted by Diamond (1997), more research on methodological variations is needed, as 
well as a better theoretical basis for predicting when and why different methodologies will 
affect mock jurors’ decisions. It is striking that only 26 and 11 published studies could be 
found comparing, respectively, different participant samples and trial presentation media, 
in a fi eld containing several hundred studies at least (113 in the fi rst 20 years of Law and 
Human Behavior alone). Nonetheless, despite the variety of approaches to conducting jury 
simulation research, few differences have been found as a function of either who the mock 
jurors are or how the mock trial is presented. Thus, although simulations have not become 
more realistic over time, it may not matter much. Two decades of additional research 
support Bray & Kerr’s (1979, p. 117) conclusion, regarding the ecological validity of jury 
simulations, that “the pattern of results does not warrant the negative reactions of some 
evaluators.” These fi ndings bode well for the feasibility of generalizing from simulation 
studies to the behavior of real jurors. 
Although these fi ndings should be reassuring to researchers conducting simulation 
studies, a note of caution is warranted as well, for two reasons. First, the courts have not 
welcomed psycholegal research fi ndings with open arms, especially when they derive from 
methods that are neither very realistic nor representative of actual legal processes (Diamond, 
1997; Ellsworth, 1988). Thus, researchers interested in the practical applications of their 
results would be well advised to adhere to Diamond’s (1997) recommendation to conduct 
“Stage One” research with relatively “easy” methods (e.g., students, brief written trials), to 
be replicated in “Stage Two” research with harder, more representative methods (e.g., real 
jurors or community adults, videotaped trials). 
Second, with regard to the issues reviewed in the present paper, no research has 
manipulated the mock juror sample and trial medium in the same experiment, in order to 
investigate possible interactions between these variables. In addition, the present review 
addressed only two aspects of simulation research. The potential impact of other factors, 
such as variations in whether or not the mock jurors deliberate and the consequentiality of 
the task, requires further investigation (see Diamond, 1997, for a review). On the whole, 
relatively little research on jury decision making has directly addressed issues of validity; 
of that which has, while the majority has tended to fi nd few differences as a function of 
verisimilitude, such null fi ndings are not universal. Questions of ecological validity are 
ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY OF JURY SIMULATIONS 89
ultimately empirical in nature (Kramer & Kerr, 1989). While the present review suggests 
that a jury deliberating on the ecological validity of jury simulation research would lean 
toward a fi nding in favor of the null hypothesis, the courts are demanding more data and 
applying a near-unanimous decision rule (Diamond, 1997). 
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